In order to ensure profitability for shareholders, optimal contracting recommends the alignment between executive compensation and company performance. Large organizations have therefore adopted executives remuneration systems in order to induce positive market reaction and motivate executives. Complex compensation schemes are designed by Boards of Directors using strong pay-performance incentives that explain high levels of executive pay along with company size, demand for management skills and executive influence. However, the literature remains inconclusive on the pay-performance relationship owing to the various empirical methods used by researchers. Additionally, there has been little effort in the literature to compare methodologies on the pay-performance relationship.
INTRODUCTION
By the 1980s, the corporate ideology that the professional managerial class should replace paternalistic management was well-established in organizations. Therefore, in order to align executives' interests to theirs and ensure profitability, shareholders opted to develop complex executive financial incentives organized around company performance indicators (Abowd & Kaplan, 1999) . Particularly, optimal pay contracts are commonly viewed as the mean to address the principal agent problem that emerge with separation of ownership and control of the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Hall, 2003 , Bebchuk & Fried, 2004 ). De facto, some studies have evidenced the positive response from markets following the implementation of incentives for executives (Tehranian & Waegelein, 1985) . In South Africa, the relationship between executive pay and company performance is advocated by the King III Code and Report on Governance.
The issue of executive compensation is of central importance as executive incentive misalignment has been advanced as one driver of the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] (Gordon, 2010) , although Kaplan (2013) argues that, despite high, executive pay levels have been constrained to less than 1% of company earnings for the period from 1993 to 2011. In addition, the effect of executive pay on market performance has declined since the financial crisis of 2008 in South Africa (Bussin & Modau, 2015) .
Despite a large literature, the global empirical evidence on the existence and strength of the relationship between firm performance and executive pay is inconclusive (Frydman & Jenter, 2010) . The mixed findings are attributed to the variety of methodologies used by researchers (Callan & Thomas, 2014 ) and the lack of consensus on the most applicable theoretical perspective (Frydman & Jenter, 2010) . Given this insight, the purpose of the study is to establish and examine the executive pay-firm performance relationship using and comparing three complementary methods on panel data from South African listed companies.
The paper is structured as follows. The first part reviews the existing literature on executive pay and firm performance, and the existing approaches. The methodology is presented in the second part. Lastly, the results of the study are presented and discussed.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Executive compensation composition
Before 1960, executive compensation was traditionally composed of basic salary and annual bonus. However, over the years, organizations have opted to design executive pay around equity-based pay as these models were favored by shareholders. In fact, the higher proportion of equity-based pay was used by companies to reduce fixed costs (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1987) . Indeed, these incentives, either cash or equity-based pay, were often tied to financial indicators, either short or long-term (Sigler et al., 2011) . Between 1993 and 2001, for the top 23 wealthiest countries, equity-based pay increased from 6% to 22% and was associated with a sharp rise of executive pay (Hall, 2003) . Kaplan (2013) noted that American CEOs earned 200 times the income of the average household and that executive pay levels have increased by almost 500% in the last 30 years.
Executive compensation determinants and theoretical perspectives
Optimal contracting implies that incentives are linked to performance so that executives bear the costs and rewards of their decisions, and executives and shareholders' interests are aligned. Remuneration committees that might involve the Board of Directors are tasked to design executive packages (Jensen & Murphy, 1990 (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004 ). According to managerial contract theory, executives are able to exert influence on the Board of Directors or the remuneration committee in order to benefit from favorable pay packages (Anabtawi, 2005) . To that end, CEOs and executives use four types of power: structural power, ownership power, expert power and prestige power (Finkelstein, 1992) . In addition, benchmarking might result in compensation packages that are not related to the firm performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003) .
Additionally, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) found that stakeholders' dissatisfaction with executive pay levels had an influence on executive pay levels. Therefore, critics view executives' pay design as a characteristic of failure of corporate governance in organizations. Following these developments, restricted shares rather than options are now incorporated in equity-based pay in order to mitigate motivation and loyalty to the company.
Company characteristics are indicated as having an influence on executive pay settings (Frydman & Jenter, 2010) . Large companies allocate a higher proportion of equity-based pay in executive total pay (Benston, 1985) . The stability of pay-size elasticity in some sectors also indicates an executive pay designed on sales growth rather than the fluctuations of the market performance (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985) . Lastly, the size and life cycle of the company are found to have an influence on executive pay. For instance, equity-based pay is generally designed in companies during their growth stage. In contrast, companies at a maturing stage favor fixed pay (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1987 ).
The relationship between executive pay and company performance
A significant amount of research has been devoted to the relationship between executive pay and firm performance, particularly following the corporate scandals in the 2000s that were preceded with soaring levels of executive pay (Bebchuk et al., 2003) . Early economic researchers assume that pay is critical in performance, as both variables are associated and markets react positively to incentive pay contracts (Raviv, 1985) . Although contested, a large part of literature proposes a small positive association between executive pay and firm performance (Frydman & Saks, 2010; Pepper & Gore, 2014; Bussin & Modau, 2015) .
In addition to the mixed results, there is no consensus on the adapted methodology which varies from regressions, fixed effects, first difference to lagged dependent variable, nor model specifications for measuring the relationship between the firm performance and executive pay (Allison, 1994) .
Some cross-sectional studies indicate that 10% increase in market performance is associated with executive pay increases comprised between 2.2% and 4.8% (Hall & Murphy, 2002 (Liker et al., 1985) . In addition, the need to control for several variables in fixed effects models poses analytical challenges at various levels (Allison, 1994) .
First difference models are used to predict the consequences of repeated events improving the accuracy of a basic cross-sectional model. It reduces and eliminates the effect of several unchanging variables (Allison, 1994) . The model is appropriate to measure significant variations in the explanatory variables (Liker et al., 1985) . Although weak, Jensen and Murphy (1990) evidence the pay-performance relationship when firm size is not included. Similarly, Kato and Kubo (2006) found that 10% increase of Return on Assets (ROA) increases CEO cash pay by 14.2% when size is not a strong mediator. However, unmeasured factors that change significantly and that may impact the analysis are not eliminated (Liker et al., 1985) .
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) models are also used on panel data manipulation. The models assume that the current dependent variable is related to its lagged value (Liker et al., 1985) and allows to remove autocorrelation. The model predictions are generally lower than fixed effects and first difference models predictions that exclude lagged pay. Hambrik and Finkelstein (1995) find that 10% increase in ROE would increase CEO total pay by 2%.
Lastly, long-term models are used to determine the long-term impact of performance on pay. It assumes a geometric decay in the response of pay to performance. These models find a relationship between market and accounting returns to executive pay (Canarella & Nourayi, 2008 (2003) includes company size, market returns and ROA. It is estimated using standard linear, instrumental variable (IV) estimators and Monte Carlo simulations and indicates that 10% increase in returns increases CEO total pay by 5% and 10% increase in ROA decreases pay by 0.6% in the long term. They conclude that executives that increase accounting returns in the short run are negatively affected in the long run. Other studies indicate that the pay-performance relationship is non-linear and that executive contracts are designed to encourage risk taking in accounting measures and risk avoidance in market measures accordingly to agency theory (Canarella & Nourayi, 2008) .
The diversity of the factors studied in the literature might have resulted in the mixed findings. In addition, the strength of the pay-performance relationship varies according to the underlying specification. Additionally, the variety of empirical models has resulted in a difficulty in comparing the results. Given the mixed results on the pay-performance relationship, the change of structure of executive pay towards shares over years (Bebchuk et al., 2003) , and the stability of the ratio of executive pay to company profits, the purpose of the study is to establish and explore the relationship between executive pay and firm performance using panel data from South African listed companies with three complementary methods.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research design
In order to establish the positive relationship between executive pay and company performance, three methods were used. The first method uses descriptive statistics to compare pay to earnings ratio in order to provide an initial indication of a potential link pay-performance. The second method is a multivariate analysis based on a restricted first difference model. Finally, the third method relies on an unrestricted first difference model. The model was tested on longitudinal data from listed companies and controls for the differences in individuals pay contracts over 11-year period. The individual relationships are aggregated in order to estimate a moderated relationship in order to reduce the effect of outliers.
Population and sample
The population of the study was companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). It was assumed that in these large companies, the agency perspective could be used to explore the issue of separation of ownership and control as described by Jensen et al. (1976) . In addition, large companies tend to provide executives with shares more frequently than small companies (Frydman & Saks, 2010) . Therefore, the study is able to evaluate the pay-performance relationship based on cash pay and total pay in line with the literature. Cash pay includes the yearly basic salary and cash incentives. It includes short-term incentives based on 1-year performance, as well as long-term incentives based on multi-year performance. Total pay includes cash pay and equity-based pay, which is comprised of options and restricted shares (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004 ).
Due to the difficulty of obtaining executive pay data, the study was limited to a small sample. Data constraints require the study to focus on either one sector or similar sectors in order to ensure validity for one sector (Florin, Hallock, & Webber, 2010) . The sample for the study consisted of companies belonging to the Consumer Goods and Consumer and Services under the ICB system. Indeed, there is a correlation of 0.99, 0.90 and 0.83 for these sectors returns over a 1, 5 and 10-year period, respectively, under the ICB system ("Selecting Sector Benchmarks", 2015). The assumption behind this strategy is that the pay structure of these companies is comparable. CEOs and Directors' cash and total pay data, and company size were manually extracted from annual reports. Performance measures such as return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and markets returns (share price performance) were obtained from McGregor BFA and were again validated from annual reports.
Research instrument
The model in this study addresses most of the limitations of empirical models in this research domain. It is developed from basic fixed effects model. The predictor variables include ROA, ROE and market returns.
The main model for the study is the unrestricted first difference model (Joskow & Rose, 1994) which is simplified for the study into: The model can include company size, which provides a strong causal link between pay and performance, as indicated in the following equation (2): 
where Z is company size.
The restricted model is a simple first difference model as follows:
by assuming that 01234 .
Data analysis and interpretation
The study used a standard linear estimator to evaluate the response of both cash and total pay to a change in predictor variables such as ROA, ROE and market returns. The restricted first-difference model as described in equation (3) was used to compare the data with previous studies. This model was used to determine the causal link between pay and performance (Liker et al., 1985 ).
The nested model described by equation (2) 
Limitations of the study
Due to significant constraints on readily executive pay data, the study was limited to a smaller dataset which affects the predictive power of the study (Florin et al., 2010) . In addition, the use of first difference models implies that several factors are differenced out contrary to fixed effects models. However, it is assumed that despite these factors, the results will not be significantly biased. Lastly, the focus on Consumer Goods and Service companies only might result in systematic bias if there is limited variation in some of the measures used (Liker et al., 1985 ).
Validity and reliability
Although the results cannot directly be generalized to the entire population of JSE listed companies, the sample group constitutes two major sectors of the JSE listed companies. The sample represents about 80% of the companies in these sectors.
The results and the predicted responses are compared with results from international studies. This allows the findings to be generalized to some degree to the larger population.
To ensure reliability, both forms of pay cash and total pay were used to ensure the robustness of the results (Florin et al., 2010) . In addition, various accounting and market performance measures, namely ROA, ROE and market returns, were used to validate the pay-performance response.
The first difference model allows better estimates than fixed effects models where correlation is an issue and is an effective approach for determining a causal link. Potential autocorrelation in the residuals was assessed using Durbin-Watson statistics.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics
The distribution of pay is highly skewed and this is more evident in larger companies. Therefore, average and median pay measures are considered for the analysis. The descriptive statistics presents the composition of executives' pay from 2005 to 2016 according to the company size. Long-term incentives (LTI) account for almost 50% of executive pay in large companies and just under 40% in medium companies similarly to Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Frydman and Saks (2010) who find that longterm incentives are significant in total pay. Shortterm incentives (STI) range from 17% to 25% in executives' pay in large and medium companies. Fixed pay (salary) accounts for more than 50% of executive pay in small companies ( Figure 1) . The results suggest that executive pay in larger com- 
Pay to earnings ratio
The pay to earnings ratio increases with decreasing company size ( Figures 3, 4 and 5). It is computed using median values owing to significant variations. Indeed, earnings in large companies are not comparable with earnings in small companies. The ratios for CEOs in medium size companies were between 1 and 2% until 2011, when they significantly increased until 2012, and decreased gradually to 2.5% in 2016. There is a 1-year lag in the progression between 2005 to 2012, however, the ratios are moderately aligned from 2012 onwards. Overall, although differing in magnitudes, the increase or decrease of ratios for Directors follows CEOs pay movements over the entire period. This is in line with Carpenter and Sanders (2002) argument for an align- 
The relationship between executive pay and firm performance
Multivariate analysis: restricted first difference model
The model is based in first difference specification and the set of explanatory variables include ROE, ROA and market returns represented by Note: a -unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1,000 stratified bootstrap samples.
Therefore, based on the CEO and Director pay responses to ROA and market returns, the hypothesis of the pay-performance relationship cannot be rejected. The results from the multivariate analysis are consistent with studies that use fixed effects models and first difference models (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001 ; Kato & Kubo, 2006) . It should be noted that company size is not a statistically significant factor to explain changes in pay. The CEO pay-size elasticity of 0.3 is consistent with findings from Baker et al. (1988) .
The findings of this model are consistent with the literature when considering the weak link to market returns and non-existing link to ROE and the strong relationship between ROA and executive pay. Indeed, this model and fixed effects models, which are mostly used in this research domain, predict comparable mixed results pointing out the most evident link within the sample that is with ROA. Indeed, ROE and market returns are indirectly linked to company earnings.
Unrestricted first difference model for the pay-performance relationship
The unrestricted first difference model assumes a more complex relationship that can only be observed by studying the interaction of pay and performance over a long period. The model shows that current pay levels are determined by current and previous levels of performance. ROE impacts CEO cash pay in the short and long term due to the cumulative response. The study indicates that 10% change in ROE changes CEO pay cash by 9.5% in the long run that can be decomposed as 4.3%, 3.3% and 1.9% from current, 1-year lagged and 3-year lagged response, respectively. Over time, the impact of a change in ROE on CEO cash pay decays. The cumulative response is larger than the short-term response (p-value of 0.008, F-statistic significant, Durbin-Watson statistics of 2.1). The squared correlation of this non-linear relationship is low and consistent with Joskow and Rose (1994) unrestricted model statistics. The results generally support the notion that CEO pay is linked to shareholders' returns according to optimal contracting theory.
ROA impacts CEO cash pay in the short term at 95% confidence level. 10% change in ROA would change CEO cash pay by 9.1% (20.2% in medium size companies) in the short term. A change of 10% in ROA changes CEO total pay by 34.8% in the short term and 54.8% in the long term owing to a positive 3-year lagged response of 22%. The unrestricted model is statistically significant for medium size companies (95% confidence level for CEO cash pay in the short term only). The negative 2-year lagged response of -2.4% on CEO cash pay is not statistically significant. The p-value 0.06 for F-statistic not significant at 95% level. This high pay-performance relationship with ROA explains the growth of CEO total pay for the period from 2011 to 2015.
CEO total pay responds to market returns in the short and the long term at 95% confidence level. Ten percent change in market returns changes CEO total pay by 7.4% decomposed of 3.2% and 4.2% from the current and 1-year lagged response, respectively. The response increases after 1 year and decays after two years similarly to Joskow and Rose (1994) results. In large companies, 10% change in market returns changes CEO total pay by 15%, including 6.9% and 8.1% from the current and 1-year lagged response. The cumulative impact of change in market returns on CEO total pay is similar in both medium and large size companies.
The inclusion of size in the relationship testing does not improve the pay-performance alignment contrary to the results of fixed effect models. The pay-size elasticity of about 0.2, although statistically insignificant, is consistent with the literature for cash pay. Therefore, changes in CEO pay are mostly determined by company performance. Thus, the results indicate that there is a non-linear relationship between CEO pay and company performance measures.
The unrestricted first difference model indicates that ROE has no impact on Director cash pay despite a positive relationship, which decays over time. In addition, the results indicate a positive decaying response of Director total pay to ROE despite not statistically significant relationship at 95% confidence level.
Director cash pay responds to changes in ROA in the short term and potentially in the long term owing to the bootstrap coefficient, which Ten percent change in ROA changes Director total pay by 10.7% in the short term (higher sensitivity of 25.5% for medium size companies).
There is a small negative 2-year lagged response of 15.1% (p-value = 0.732) (20.7% for medium size companies p-value = 0.028). This positive short-term and negative 2-year lagged response to ROA is similar to Boschen et al. (2003) . The pvalue of 0.15 for the F-statistics indicates the restricted model sufficiently specified at the business sector level as supported by p-value of 0.49.
Ten percent change in market returns changes Director total pay by 7.4% owing to 3.5%, 2.4% and 1.5% from the current, 1-year lagged and 2-year lagged response, respectively (Figures 9  and 10 ). However, the response of Director pay to market returns decays from the outset and as opposed to the CEO response, which starts to decay after 2 years. These results support the application of the optimal contracting theory where executive pay levels are tied to shareholders' wealth.
CEO and directors pay-performance alignment
This subsection discusses the alignment of the CEOs and directors pay packages. The CEOs and Directors pay ratios are mostly aligned. The study indicates that in medium and small size companies, CEO pay and Director pay ratio average is around 1.5. Ten percent change in ROE changes CEO and Director cash pay by 5% owing to 3.2% and 1.9% from the current and 1-year lagged response, respectively (p-value = 0.009, F-statistic significant at 95% confidence level). CEO and Director pay in small size companies are linked to ROE.
Ten percent change in ROA would change CEO and Director cash pay by 4.6% owing to 8.9% and -4.4% from the current and 2-year lagged response. The negative response can be mostly attributed to medium size companies, which are associated with high responses to ROA.
Ten percent change in ROA changes CEO and Director total pay by 12.2%. Lagged responses are not statistically significant and the moderation removes the impact of a negative lagged response.
Ten percent change in market returns changes CEO and Director total pay in medium size companies by 29.5% in the short term and 44% in the long term owing to the positive 3-year lagged response of 14.8%. The cumulative response for Director total pay is comparable to the CEO total pay response to market returns. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.443 is just below the ideal range of 1.5 to 2.5 and the p-value Note: a -unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1,000 stratified bootstrap samples. Note: a -unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1,000 stratified bootstrap samples. of 0.00 is significant at 95% level. This moderated relationship is more aligned with the CEO relationship.
The cumulative response of CEO and Director pay to a 10% increase in market returns is 7.9% for the business sector, 16.5% for large size companies, 15.6% for medium size companies, and 2.6% for small size companies. The responses decay over 2 to 4-year period.
These results suggest that there is a significant number of Directors whose pay arrangements are similar to CEOs pay arrangements that was particularly evident in medium size companies.
CONCLUSION
Given the various methods that have led researchers to diverse findings and conclusions, the study aim was to establish an executive pay-performance relationship using data from listed companies from the Consumer Goods and Services sector in South Africa using three methods. The first method indicates that the ratio of executive pay to company earnings is confined within a range suggesting a relationship between executive pay and company performance. The second first restricted first difference model establishes a strong positive pay-performance association using ROA indicating that current pay levels are determined by current and previous levels of performance. No long-term response of executive pay to company performance was found. However, the respective lack of and weak relationships between executive pay and ROE and market returns reflects the limitations of the second model. The unrestricted first difference model shows that the pay-performance relationship is non-linear as the response of pay to changes in performance decays over time. Executive pay responds differently to measures of performance. There is a strong positive relationship between executive pay and ROE with a response of pay to ROE decaying after a year. Similarly, a strong pay-performance relationship based on ROA is characterized by both short-and long-term impacts similarly to Boschen et al. (2003) predictions. The change in ROA may have a positive cumulative effect, which is either lower or higher than the short-term effect. Finally, a change in market returns can impact executive pay over a 2 to 4-year period. The response of Director pay to market returns starts to decay after 1 year whereas the response of CEO pay to market returns starts to decay after 2 years similarly to Boschen and Smith (1995) and Joskow and Rose (1994) .
Therefore, the study finds that the pay-performance association is evident when using both accounting and market performance measures providing support for the optimal contracting theoretical perspective, although the study cannot reject an alternative theory such as managerial power theory in setting executive pay arrangements. In addition, company size in the model is not found to improve the magnitude of the pay-performance relationship despite company size influencing the structure of executive pay. The results are generally consistent with international studies and highlight the complexity of the pay-performance relationship. 
